Volume 5, Issue 1: Not all evidence proves, but all that proves is evidence

 

Not all evidence proves, but all that proves is evidence

 

Karin Zachmann, Mariacarla Gadebusch Bondio, Saana Jukola, and Olga Sparschuch (eds.), Evidence Contestation: Dealing with Dissent in Knowledge Societies. London and New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. xvi + 329. Hardcover ISBN: 978-1-032-21910-3. OPEN ACCESS

 

 

There are many riddles that keep mankind in moving. Some have been with us since ancient times, others maybe just for a few days. Why people are unable to accept proven facts is probably one of the older ones. As well as how, when all the evidence and data have been lined up in favor of a certain point of view, why are people still able to act and believe contrary to it. The problem is perhaps similar to the ancient problem of weakness of will (akrasia) – if a person knows what is good for him, what is the right practice, why does he act contrary to it?

 

Evidence wars

Recently, the tendency to fundamentally dispute, question, and discredit the evidence, data, considerations, and arguments brought by the other party during a dialogue has strengthened and intensified again. This is what scientists do to pseudoscientists – they point out that their arguments are weak, their data is unreliable, and their evidence does not stand up to tests, they fail to be real scientific evidence. But this is also what pseudo-scientists do to scientists, as they try to point out that scientific evidence is flawed and biased, and scientists are corrupt, biased, and serve special interests. The evidence and papers of scientists are the result of intensive breeding, means of self-maintenance of the existing mainstream power positions and relationships. In the same way, the proofs of the pseudo-scientists are fabrications, the products of wishful thinking, distortions, considerations from alternative sources that have no place outside of a narrow, usually neglected professional circle.

         The word “evidence” somehow encodes “truth”, “necessity”, “objectivity”, “independence”, maybe even “scientific”. That is why many people may think that if they find evidence for or against something, then they have won their case already. If facts speak for themselves, why shouldn’t evidence do the same – especially if the evidence itself comes from the facts (otherwise they would be fabrications). The history of humanity, of which the history of science is just as much a part as the history of politics and mentality, somehow always shows that we should take a step back, and tackle these sensitive questions with renewed strength, since things are not that simple.

 

Is the evidence debatable?

Is evidence allowed to be disputed? If I ask the question in such a way that all valid scientific research proves the safety and effectiveness of vaccines, and yet many people raise their voices against vaccines, then I am obviously framing things in the way that our colleagues who are more skeptical of vaccines are plain wrong, just like weak-willed people. After all, on what basis does a layman question the evidence of scientists? But if I frame the story in such a way that one of the most important criteria for scientific progress is openness to criticism, questioning everything, productive skepticism, then things are already different.

         That’s why evidence is such a sensitive thing. Quite likely, each scientific revolution was preceded by theories that were proven by the standards of the era (or earlier eras). We had good reason to believe in them. Of course, at some point, concerns, problems, or, as the famous science historian and philosopher Thomas Kuhn put it, anomalies arose, and then more and more members of the community began to question the provenance of previously proven facts. If we don't want to say that nothing has ever been proven, then based on the lessons of the history of science, we have to say that provenness and proof are concepts that change in space and time.

 

The paradox of the knowledge-based society

A recently published open-access volume, Evidence Contestation, edited by Karin Zachmann, Mariacarla Gadebusch Bondio, Saana Jukola, and Olga Sparschuch deals with this very problem. The authors of do not, however, grieve about the level of intentional and malicious evidence-falsification and evidence-skepticism of our time. A significant part of the studies highlights the productive side of dissent within the scientific community, as well as in the public-science relation. They point out why it is important and in what ways it can work if people look more closely at the evidence and express their skepticism and disagreement. As stated in the introduction, the paradox of knowledge societies is becoming more and more apparent: while society is increasingly dependent on science and the results of science (also at the level of our everyday decisions), more and more people can question scientific knowledge in more and more different ways. Although the authors do not say it, we can even look at it from the point of view that if, according to Immanuel Kant and the Enlightenment, we must strip off the oppression of external authorities and dare to rely on our own understanding, then why would we rely on experts who just represent mainstream power? The relationship between experts and the Enlightenment is anything but obvious and clear.

         Don’t get me wrong! The book is not about any such extremist position that either destroys the authority of science or puts science in a God-position. It is about the fact that there are many examples when either laypeople or marginalized experts were able to question the currently available evidence in a productive, fruitful, and effective way and successfully disputed the currently accepted facts.

 

With science against science

Such interesting situations resulted from the “counter-science” (Gegenwissenschaft) and “anti-science” movements, which were skeptical of nuclear science and started with activist excitement and enthusiasm in the 1970s (subjects of chs. 7-8). In contrast to the basic engineering and natural science approach, the groups involved drew attention to the wider dangers and problems of nuclear energy development, and through years of continuous, systematic and increasingly sophisticated procedures, they achieved that German political decision-makers, and the highest academic life were forced to take their evidence into account and modify official policies accordingly. Of course, as the chapters document nicely, most of these alternative movements and marginalized groupings became part of mainstream science in course of time, but this can presumably be seen as a success for a while rather than the destruction of the movement.

         Similarly, in the case of citizen science (ch. 9), we see that, to varying degrees, citizens have an increasing saying and influence on the functioning of science. In the simplest case, people provide data through some kind of application, which data can then be processed by scientists. Such projects are widespread, it is enough to think of mosquito monitoring, ticks, or, most recently, heartworm in dogs. In the case of other projects, citizens can already participate in the design of the questionnaires and the research, and possibly during the evaluation and analysis afterward. And in the most communal versions, laypeople themselves organize and carry out the research independently of the scientists. All these projects document different ways in which non-scientists can legitimately influence science. Although citizen science is still in its infancy, it is already very clear how fruitful it can be when scientists and lay people come together on several fronts. Science is undoubtedly softened in some form by citizen science, but it is still science, i.e., it takes place within a transparent and accountable scientific framework, or at least that would be the ideal.

 

Evidence and decisions

Evidence is also a difficult thing because, while we should accept theories by weighting the evidence, and policies are based on the theories, and decisions are based on the policies, the weight of the evidence tends to crush us rather than relieve us. If we take the role of evidence seriously, we often end up with no idea what to do! It is enough to think of psychology, nutrition science, sociology, or even political science—in these sciences, often there is no consensus yet on the issues that affect us currently, or even if there is a narrower consensus, its foundations are still lacking. One of the studies (ch. 10) in the volume draws attention to the fact that in the case of nutrition science, data often points in opposite directions—so even if someone manages to extract something from the extremely complicated journals, the first question they face is which expert to believe. According to the lessons of the chapter, because the data is incomplete and the evidence is conflicting, people will make their decisions with the help of some kind of substitute (once the abstract rational decision theory breaks down—not so surprisingly), and this substitute will often be some kind of moral consideration. Those who, for example, act according to the values of care and fairness from the beginning, are more inclined to eat from ecologically sustainable sources, usually meatless, while subjects who emphasize authority (and the discipline and order that comes with it), for example, were more often meat-consumers and cared less about their ecological footprint.

         But we can also take a contemporary domestic example. An article was recently published, according to which, based on the latest research, the usefulness of masks in the context of the coronavirus is strongly questioned. Those who didn’t believe in the masks in the first place could obviously sit back, because now they had scientific proof for their skepticism. These people obviously did not continue their research to see if this is really the case, or if the study was flawed on any level. However, if we take the non-dogmatic attitude constantly expressed by both parties (maskers and mask-deniers), then it would have dictated that there is no stopping, the way to produce knowledge is skepticism, so let’s look at the criticisms! Those who believed in the usefulness of masks from the beginning, obviously searched for loopholes, were skeptical about the study, suspected that something went wrong. Based on the latest reports, it seems that the source of the error has been found, and we don’t have to bury the masks just yet. After this, the matter will presumably continue to roll in the opposite direction: those who did not believe in masks will now look for loopholes, and those who believed in them can lean back, knowing that science has corrected itself again. Perhaps they will be able to decide the question on a consensual basis over time, but the example clearly shows that the evidence does not speak for itself, and it takes a lot of time, faith and trust for a given expert community to be able to make textbook knowledge from its own evidence.

 

The unbearable lightness of evidence

The biggest problem with evidence is that it is hardly accessible to most of us. Not because scientific articles are incomprehensible. Of course, they are incomprehensible, but if science popularizers and science communication experts tell them intelligibly, the question still arises as to whether we really had access to the evidence, or merely to the reports of scientists - now distorted due to simplification (see ch. 11 about journalism). Rather, it seems that people are not in a position to collect, assess and weigh the evidence. We do not have the required tools (basement-CERN, garden observatory, kitchen gene sequencer, desktop quantum computer does not count—we have generational traumas, but it is still too sensitive a topic), nor decades-old, traceable expert qualifications, to ensure that we can contribute to and understand the emerging, exploratory, uncertain, and forming body of science. What remains are reports and autobiographies of scientists, science journalists (who themselves constantly dance on thin ice in the crossfire of valid and interesting stories), and generational experiences.

         Traditional ecological knowledge (an unfortunately absent topic from the book), is precisely an area that often goes against scientific knowledge and its canonized forms of evidence. Recently, researchers have begun to recognize the potential value in traditional knowledge (animal husbandry, horticulture, architecture, etc.), but it is still not really developed how traditional knowledge performs when it comes to evidence. If we look at it as data, then science can overwrite it (since it is the social practice par excellence that concerns data management), but most people interested in traditional forms of knowledge would not be happy to let science overrule another field. But if science cannot overwrite it, because first-person knowledge and knowledge handed down through traditions have a special authority, then what is the point of science? The debate doesn't end here, it begins here, let's talk about the evidence!

         Evidence Contestation is thus a really important edition, that concerns biological, medical, physical, and ecological sciences, and shows in various detailed studies, how dissent among scientists and the public could importantly and fruitfully contribute to our understanding of evidence-making and shaping. The editors did a great job in selecting studies and fields for the volume, and as most authors are coming from the German-speaking territories, people reading only in English are able, finally, to get a gist of what science-studies and philosophies are doing in another major language. 

 

Adam Tamas Tuboly
Institute of Philosophy, Research Centre for the Humanities, ELRN

Supported by the MTA Lendulet Values and Science Research Group