Volume 1, Issue 5: Valuing value-discussions in science

Valuing value-discussions in science

Kevin C. Elliott and Daniel Steel (eds.), Current Controversies in Values and Science. New York and London: Routledge, 2017. pp. ix + 186. Hardcover ISBN 978-1-138-19328-4. £130.

There are fashions in the history of philosophy of science regarding what are the main concepts that are being used to analyze science and which of the scientific concepts are to be analyzed at all in the first place. In the first half of the twentieth century – at least according to the received view, which, it has to be added, is not entirely far from the truth – these were “verification”, “falsification”, “explanation”, “induction” and many more, often connected to a supposed general methodology and logical side of scientific theories. Questions of values were usually set aside; they became subjects for anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and historians. As time went on, fashions changed and values turned into respectful research objects for philosophersof science.

            Almost countless books appeared in the last two or three decades about values and their role in science and society; many of those books (and important papers) were written by such well-known authors who contributed their own also to the latest additions to the literature on the subject. Current Controversies in Values and Science, edited by Kevin C. Elliott and Daniel Steel in Routledge’s “Current Controversies in Philosophy” series was published in 2017. The book was, however, not just a simple addition, but also an important work for scholars, teachers and students as well.

            Routledge’s series is structured usually by having ten authors, ordered into five chapters to debate five related topics. This way of disseminating philosophy is really helpful as it goes back (almost) directly to the Socratic tradition of philosophy, namely developing and criticizing ideas discursively. As it was argued recently, contemporary philosophy tends to be an industry of isolated, non-cited and non-quoted remote papers, written by such scholars who are specialized in nuanced topics. Gathering them in a volume, ensuring them a place to directly discuss each other’s work and even letting them react to the critical points seems to a nice way to go into the major function of philosophy. Even if we are not dealing with a typical and ordered dialogue, it is still quite close to the essence of the old ideal.

            “Current Controversies in Values and Science” is focusing, obviously, on the issues that surround values and science, their relation, and interdependence. The most general question is whether what types of values are instantiated by science in theory and in practice and whether our practice could and should be changed in the light of our findings. To be more specific, philosophers tend to distinguish two types of values, namely epistemic and non-epistemic values. Epistemic values are those values that contribute in a way to our knowledge or belief. The most typical candidates are logical consistency, simplicity, generality, explanatory power, unification, and empirical adequacy. Though the list could be continued, this shall already give us a hint about what is this all about. The point seems to be that those theories that instantiate or bear these values (whatever these values exactly are) are either closer to the truth (or are simply true) than those which do not. That is, a theory which can account for the most empirical data shall be taken to be closer to the truth than the theory which accounts for less empirical data. Non-epistemic values present a difficult case too. Nonetheless, we have some typical candidates in the form of social, moral, political or religious values. The point here is that those theories that instantiate a certain political view, or consistent with a religious idea, are better (in whatever sense) than the rivals. A theory, which is close to the democratic ideal of knowledge dissemination and exhibits the value of toleration in its hypothesis, is better than a theory, which is built on racists, sexists and classist considerations.

            For many decades (perhaps centuries), the ideal was a so-called value-free ideal of science according to which science is built purely on epistemic values. It tracks the truth, follows the data – rendered objective by epistemically rational standards – wherever they lead. As philosophers, historians and sociologists of science have shown – or at least argued – in the last few decades, this ideal is far from reality. Scientists are governed by their non-epistemic values and the way science develops is rarely attached directly and purely to epistemic values. How to deal with this tension; what to do with the recognition that our epistemically oriented scientists are just as human as we are; how to account for the idea that non-epistemic values are present inevitable in our scientific activities and theories; these are just a few of our basic questions.

            The book picks up five themes from a very long list of important contemporary debates and provides some very limited space to its authors to discuss these important questions. While a regular paper is not longer than 13 short pages with quite big typesetting, the authors are often able to turn this into their advantage as solidly presenting their material, focusing just on the arguments of each others. The other side of the picture is, of course, that the shortness and denseness of the individual chapters make the whole a quite complicated and difficult reading.

            We start with a discussion on how to distinguish epistemic and non-epistemic values (Part I, Chapters 1 and 2, Hugh Lacey and Phyllis Rooney) in the scientific research. After some initial considerations Part II (Chapters 3 and 4) consider the question whether science indeed should be based on epistemic values in the sense that when a conflict arises, epistemic values shall be prioritized over non-epistemic values. Daniel Steel argues for a positive thesis, while Matthew Brown claims that non-epistemic values have the same status and rational background as epistemic values, thus prioritizing the former over non-epistemic ones is a misleading idea to follow.

            As we got some reasons to revisit our views on non-epistemic values and their place in science, Part III (Chapters 5 and 6) presents a possible way for non-epistemic values to enter the fieldand method of science. Scientists, who collect data inductively, are often faced with such troubles that arise from handling their findings inadequately. But even if some sort of – epistemically induced order – could be injected to the data, scientists have to find a point when they decide that their data is sufficientand properlyorderedto justify or refute a certain hypothesis. The so-called inductive risk is the problem that scientists might encounter false positive or false negative results, which could have been avoided possible by a different ordering and structuring their data. Even though there are various norms and standards about epistemic procedures and methods within science, none of them tells you in a logically necessarily way how to work with your data, thus seemingly internal norms of science cannot prevent the risk of obtaining false negative and false positive results. Heather Douglas goes for the claim that when facing a case of inductive risk, scientists have to incorporate non-epistemic values in their scientific reasoning. Taking the contrary claim, Gregor Betz argues that by working out certain ideal norms and processes, scientists can and should avoid falling back on non-epistemic values when they face uncertainties in their scientific work.

            After these very general chapters, the last two parts narrow down somewhat the discussion. Part IV (Chapters 7 and 8) concerns the ideal that to make science more democratic, social and non-epistemic diversity should be presented or built into science itself somehow. Both Kristina Rolin and Kristen Intemann argues that diversity should be noted in science, though they disagree about a particular way to do that, namely about the social value management ideal. According to the ideal, “negative influenceof values in science can be ‘managed’ by ensuring that they will becritically scrutinized by diverse participants that have equal opportunity toraise criticisms and have those criticisms taken seriously” (p. 131.).

            Finally, the book ends with Part V (Chapters 9 and 10) with a discussion about how biomedical, especially pharmaceutical research should be revisited and reshaped to meet certain epistemic and non-epistemic values, that is, how should they be restructured in order to serve values of social justice and democracy. James Robert Brown and Julian Reiss refer to each other’s chapters continuously in their papers. Though they share some basic assumptions and commitments, they seem to disagree about the exact way of handling the issue (that is, whether more national regularities shall be introduced, i.e. biomedical research shall be socialized, or more individual responsibilities would mean the solution).

            And that is an important editorial issue here. Most authors in the various parts either do not refer to each other very often or when they do, a general agreement is still prevailing the whole discussion. For example, as it was mentioned, in Part IV, Kristina Rolin argues that social diversity is best incorporated into science by adopting the social value management ideal. In Chapter 8, Kristen Intemann goes for a stronger claim and she argues that while the social value management ideal is a good start, it runs quickly into troubles and we should find a stricter way to exclude racists, sexists and similar approaches within science. Intemann, after all, goes in the same direction as Rolin did, though her way is a bit narrower perhaps. It would have been interesting to see here a chapter, which argues that diversity shall not be taken into account at all, as science is a one-dimensional and determinate epistemic approach that goes for objective truth. Or so; at least that would have been a real debate. But similar considerations apply to almost every Part: both authors in the given sections go into the same direction, or if not, they are still more similar than one might expect from a critical discussion.

            An even more general issue that should be raised is the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values. Almost every Part (except perhaps the last) is concerned in some form or other with this distinction. Part I, for example, is devoted entirely to the question of whether they could be distinguished at all. Other chapters note the difficulty but proceed further anyways by making the distinction. As it was discussed e.g. by Daniel Steel (pp. 53-54.), to answer whether epistemic values shall be prioritized or not in science, we shall be able to tell which are the epistemic values at all. Also in the context of inductive risk, if we let non-epistemic values to play a role in solving the (let’s say) halting problem (to know when to stop and make a stand about a hypothesis), we have to know which are the non-epistemic values. And so on. But it still turns out to be that we have as many suggestions about the distinction as many authors contributed to the volume.

            Another general concern is that all chapters tell us that science shall be protected from political and cultural bias and from the invalid influence of non-epistemic values. On the other hand, every author took it for granted that the pluralistic, critical and democratic approach is the ideal stance of science. But why shall we think that those virtues shall take us closer to the truth? (A similar problem is discussed Kristen Intemann, under the name of “the Bias Paradox”.) We might motivate these values easily from outside of science, but how shall we do that within science? With epistemic or non-epistemic values? With the latter, we do not seem to go far, rather just in circles. With the former, we get closer perhaps to Matthew Brown’s view, who argues that value judgments are judgments, after all, thus they have a certain empirical basis and context, thus they have an equal role and place in science to epistemic judgments. 

            The volume contains many insightful arguments. Though they are very reasonable, they also often tend to be quite abstract and nuanced. Thus, they seem to be very helpful and rational in theory and on paper, while it is a bit questionable whether such stratified views could be properly implemented into practice at the moment of action. On the other hand, if we are to contemplate the educational value of these discussions we might face the following trouble. In public and political discussions, the question is still whether science is value-free or not. While among philosophers, it could be a standard view that science is notvalue-free, one still has to make the addition “in one sense of the term”. Thus ammunition is given to the defenders of the “value-free” ideal.

            All in all, “Current Controversies in Values and Science” is an outstandingly helpful summary of the recent debates on how science and values are entangled. With its short chapters, students might feel lighted to approach these complex matters and form their own opinion about what is at stake in public debates and how could philosophy help them to assess the arguments and to see through the positions.

Adam Tamas Tuboly

Postdoctoral Researcher, Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Supported by the MTA BTK Lendület Morals and Science Research Group.